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Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc.: Extension of
the Tort of Retaliatory Discharge to
Employees Covered by Collective
Bargaining Agreements
INTRODUCTION

Under the employment at-will rule,' an employer can discharge
an employee without cause and without notice.2 Although the rule
also allows an employee to leave without cause and without notice,
in operation the rule has had a more severe effect on the employee
1. The common law rule of termination at-will was first articulated by H.G. Wood in
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANTS, § 134, at 272 (1877). The rule

has been stated as follows: "[Tihe right of the employee to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason,
to dispense with the services of the employee." Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 17475 (1908).
2. See, e.g., Reich v. Holiday Inn, 454 So. 2d 982 (Ala. 1984) (in absence of employment contract for specific duration, at-will employee had no cause of action for discharge
which resulted when he refused to engage in illegal activities); Andress v. Augusta Nursing Facilities, Inc., 156 Ga. App. 775, 275 S.E.2d 368 (1984) (employer can discharge
employees for any reason, including refusal by employees to engage in illegal activities,
since employees are terminable at-will); Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So. 2d 637
(La. App. 1982) (terminable at-will employee has no cause of action even though discharge may be in violation of personnel manual); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397
So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981) (employee who is discharged for filing workers' compensation
claim has no cause of action since Mississippi recognizes employment at-will rule); Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. App. 1981) (employee, under employment at-will rule, can be discharged without cause). See 9 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 1017 (3d ed. 1967); A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, §§ 674-84
(Kaufman Supp. 1982). See also infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text. See generally

Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV 1405 (1967); Giusseppe, The Recognition of Public
Policy Exceptions to the Employment At- Will Rule: A Legislative Function?, 11 FORDHAM L. REV. 722 (1983); Murg & Scharman, Employment At-Will: Do the Exceptions
Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REV. 329 (1982); Naylor, Employment At-Will: The
Decay of an Anachronistic Shield for Employers?, 33 DICK. L. REV. 113 (1983-84); Peck,
Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(1979); Rowhwer, Terminable At-Will Employment: New Theories for Job Security, 15
PAC. L.J. 759 (1984); Summers, IndividualProtection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for
a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); Note, Protecting Employment At-Will Rule Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980); Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged
Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Common Law Action]; Comment, Employment At-Will, 68 IOWA L. REV. 787 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Employment At- Will]; Comment, Limiting the Right to Terminate At- Will -Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201 (1982).
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than on the employer.3 In the past, employees were able to move
from one job to another more freely than they can in today's more
specialized workplace. 4 To ameliorate the harsh effects of the atwill rule on employees, legislatures and courts have restricted the
ability of employers to discharge employees without cause. 5
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 6 protects the
rights of employees to unionize and bargain collectively with their
employers. 7 Collective bargaining has enabled unions to enter into
agreements which provide that the employer can discharge the
union employee only for just cause.' Such agreements also often
require a terminated employee who wishes to challenge his discharge to do so through the grievance and arbitration procedures
established in the agreement.9 The United States Supreme Court
has consistently held that an employee must exhaust his remedies
3.
4.
5.
6.

See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 27-38, 55-67 and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982); for a history of the NLRA, see R. GORMAN, BASIC

TEXT ON LABOR LAW § 4-6 (1976); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW § 3-65 (C.Morris

2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPING LABOR LAW].
7. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) states:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the
refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead
to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or
necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce ...
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent
business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of
wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive
wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality
of bargaining power between employers and employees. ...
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
Certain c,,
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and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
See also infra notes 29-38.
8. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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under the agreement before he can initiate a civil action against his
employer."
Many states, including Illinois, have restricted an employer's
ability to terminate an employee without good cause by recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge." An employer commits this
tort if he discharges an employee in retaliation for actions by the
employee which are favored as a matter of public policy. The tort
was adopted because courts did not want at-will employees choosing between losing their jobs and violating public policy.' 2
Recently, courts have had to decide whether a union employee
who is covered by a collective bargaining agreement which contains grievance and arbitration procedures can bring an action in
tort for retaliatory discharge.' 3 Employers maintain that a union
employee must exhaust the grievance procedures provided by the
collective bargaining agreement before he can bring his employer
to court and that any relief should be restricted to the remedies set
forth in the agreement.' 4 Employees argue that the union employee should be able to bring an action for retaliatory discharge in
order to protect activities favored by the state as a matter of public
policy. 15 In Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc. ,16 the Illinois Supreme
10. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979)
(discharge for refusing to take lie detector test); Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc.,
548 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ark. 1982) (discharge for refusing to violate state criminal statute);
Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (discharge for refusal
to participate in anti-competitive scheme); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d
167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (discharge for refusing to engage in pricefixing scheme); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385
(1980) (discharge for insisting employer comply with state licensing and labeling law);
Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Hawaii 1982) (discharge for testifying
before grand jury); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (discharge for filing workers' compensation claim); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee
County Dept. of Labor Serv., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981) (discharge for
filing a workers' compensation claim); Firestone Textile Co. Div., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1982) (discharge for filing workers' compensation claim); Trombatta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265
N.W.2d 385 (1978) (discharge for refusing to alter illegally pollution control reports);
Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984) (discharge for filing workers' compensation claim); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (discharge for refusing to engage in unethical activities); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536
P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge for serving on jury duty); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 389 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982) (discharge for refusing to violate consumer credit
and protection laws); see also infra notes 55-87.
12. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 86-157 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
16. 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984).
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Court held that a union employee can bring an action in tort for
retaliatory discharge without exhausting his contractual
remedies. 17

This note first will review the legislative and judicial limitations
placed on the employment at-will rule, including the protections
provided by the National Labor Relations Act and the tort of
retaliatory discharge. Next, the note will discuss acceptance of the
tort action in Illinois and the Illinois Supreme Court's extension of
the tort action to union employees in Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago,
Inc. It will then examine whether this was a proper and necessary
extension of the tort in light of the federal labor law policy favoring
the use of arbitration for the settlement of grievances. Finally, this
note will discuss the impact of the Midgett decision on the collective bargaining process.
BACKGROUND

The Employment At-Will Rule
The employment at-will rule provides that an employer or an
employee can terminate the employment relationship for any or no
reason.'8 The rule reflects the laissez-faire philosophy which dominated industrial America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. 19 The employment at-will rule gave the employer great
flexibility since he could vary the number of employees he retained
as market conditions changed."°
17. Id. at 152, 473 N.E.2d at 1285.
18. The case most frequently cited in support of the employment at-will rule is Payne
v. Western & Atl. R.R. Co., 82 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on other grounds,
Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 727, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). The Payne court stated:
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, and
to discharge or retain employees at-will for good cause, or for no cause, or even
for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a
right which an employee may exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for
the same cause or want of cause as the employer.
See also supra note 1. The rule has survived in large part because of the support it found
in contract law. See Blades, supra note 2, at 1419. In contract law, there is no contract
unless there is mutuality of obligation, mutuality of remedy, and consideration. See
Murg & Scharman, supra note 2, at 336-37. In the typical employer/employee relationship, these eem..nt arc absent. 1d. Cunsequenly, when an employee is discharged, he
has no cause of action against his employer because no contract exists. Id. See also Note,
Implied Contract Rights and Job Security, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 335, 340-69 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Note, Job Security].
19. See Blades, supra note 2, at 1417.
20. See Murg & Scharman, supra note 2, at 323-26. The employment at-will rule
allowed an employer to tailor his workforce to market demands. This was not the case
under the English Rule, which raised a presumption that every employment contract was
intended to have a one-year limitation. Id.
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Although the employment at-will rule also gives the employee
the freedom to quit his job and find employment elsewhere,21 the
rule has come under attack because in the contemporary employment relationship this often is not possible.22 The workplace has
become more specialized and as a consequence, the employee is no
longer as free to move from one job to another.23 In addition,
many employees are in a position of unequal bargaining power
when negotiating employment terms with their employer.24 As a
result of this imbalance, both the judiciary and the legislature have
modified the employment at-will rule by restricting the employer's
absolute right to discharge the at-will employee.25
The National Labor Relations Act
Some of the first modifications of the employment at-will rule
resulted from the enactment of the National Labor Relations
Act.26 In enacting the NLRA, Congress was attempting to pro21. This early position on the employee's freedom to change jobs was described in
Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, Inc., 174 La. 66, 69, 139 So. 760, 761 (1932), as
follows:
An employee is never presumed to engage his services permanently, thereby
cutting himself off from all chances of improving his condition; indeed in this
land of opportunity it would be against public policy and the spirit of our institutions that any man should thus handicap himself; and the law will presume
* . . that he did not so intend.
22. See Note, Common Law Action, supra note 2, at 1443. One commentator has
stated:
We have become a nation of employees We are dependent upon others for our
means of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely dependent
on wages. If they lost their jobs, they lose every resource, except for the relief
supplied by the various forms of social security. Such dependence of the mass
of the people upon others for all their income is something new in the world.
For our generation, the substance of life is in another man's hands.
F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951). Another commentator has stated
that when an employee loses his job today, he loses more than wages. He also may lose
standing in society, employee benefits, and self-esteem. Note, Job Security, supra note 18,
at 337-410; see also T. Kahn, THE MEANING OF WORK: INTERPRETATION AND PURPOSE FOR MEASUREMENT, IN THE HUMAN MEANING OF TRIAL CHARGE (A. Campbell
& P. Converse eds. 1972); Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights, A Changing
Concept of Employment At-Will, 17 Am. Bus. 467, 470 (1980).
23. Note, Common Law Action, supra note 2, at 1443.
24. This inequality has been examined by commentators, legislatures, and courts in
an attempt to correct the imbalance. See supra note 2; infra notes 26-68 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 26-107 and accompanying text; see also supra note 11.
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982); see supra note 6 and accompanying text. Other federal statutes also have limited the absolute power of the employer to discharge his employees. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act § 15(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1982)
(retaliatory discharge for the exercise of rights under this Act illegal); Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e-2) (1982) (prohibits discriminatory
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mote the free flow of commerce through stability and peace in labor relations.27 In order to accomplish this goal, employees were
given the statutory right to organize and join a labor organization
and to bargain collectively with the employer. 28 The NLRA has
fostered the growth of collective bargaining agreements which have
done much to temper the harsh effects of the employment at-will
rule. 9
A collective bargaining agreement defines the relationships
among the employer, the employee and the union. 0 The agreement often will state the grounds upon which an employer may
discharge an employee. 3 In fact, approximately eighty percent of
all collective bargaining agreements specify that employees may be
fired only for "cause" or for "just cause. "32 Further, sixty-five percent of these agreements list specific grounds for discharge, such as
discharge on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631, 633(a) (1982) (prohibits employment
discrimination based on age or for asserting rights under the Act); Rehabilitation Act of
1973 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (1982) (prohibits discrimination in employment of handicapped persons by federal contractors or by any program receiving federal funds); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140, 1141 (1982)
(prohibits employment discrimination for asserting rights under the Act); Vietnam Era
Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (1982) (requires that covered
government contractors employ and advance in employment qualified Vietnam veterans);
Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1982) (prohibits discharge of employees initiating or
testifying in proceedings against their employers for violating the Act); Consumer Credit
Protection Act § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1977) (prohibits discharge of employees
whose wages are garnished because of indebtedness); Judiciary and Judicial Procedure
Act 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1982) (prohibits discharge of employees for jury service); Railroad
Safety Act 45 U.S.C. §§ 441(a), (h)(l) (1982) (prohibits railroad employer from discharging employees who file complaints or initiate proceedings related to railroad safety laws,
or who refuse to work based on reasonable belief that dangerous conditions exist).
27. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
28. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) ("Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, to join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
)
29. See Note, Common Law Action, supra note 2, at 1443.
30. See GORMAN, supra note 6, at 540-41.
31. Id.
32. 2 BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATiONS AND CONTRACTS § 40:i (1979). Various factors are considered in determining
whether or not a discharge is for just cause. Some of the more significant factors include
the nature of the offense, the past employment record of the employee, length of service,
whether reasonable rules have been clearly disseminated and enforced in a consistent
manner, and whether the concept of progressive discipline has been applied. Elkouri &
Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, ch. 15 (3d ed. 1976). See also Note, Discharge in the
Law of Arbitration, 20 VAND. L. REV. 81, 85-88 (1966). In the absence of a just cause
provision, arbitrators often will read one into the contract. See Summers, supra note 2, at
499-500.
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intoxication, absenteeism, and violation of company safety rules. 33
Such agreements virtually eliminate the discretion enjoyed by employers under the employment at-will rule.
The collective bargaining agreement will typically also contain
procedures which are to be utilized if a dispute over an employee's
discharge arises. 34 Specifically, most agreements will set out grievance procedures consisting of a series of steps to be taken within a
certain time period for the resolution of the dispute.35 Typically,
the grievance procedures will involve the employee and his union
representative, who takes the grievance to the employee's immediate superior and, if no settlement is reached, up through the management hierarchy.36 If the dispute remains unsettled, the
collective bargaining agreement usually requires that the dispute be
submitted to binding arbitration.37 Compared to civil litigation,
the grievance and arbitration procedures are much more informal,
expeditious, and inexpensive methods for the settling of disputes.38
Historically, the courts and the National Labor Relations Board
have held that grievance and arbitration procedures are the appropriate methods for resolving disputes and that the union employee
must exhaust such contractual remedies before he files a civil action against his employer. 39 The purpose of this exhaustion doc33. 2 BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
TIONS AND CONTRACTS § 40:1-3 (1978).

34.

NEGOTIA-

Grievance and arbitration provisions are found in virtually all formal collective

bargaining agreements currently in effect. See 2 BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.,
NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS § 51:1 (1983).
35. Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 32, at 120-21.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. GORMAN, supra note 6, at 543; see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 55-58 (1974) (grievance procedures provide a quick and inexpensive method for
the settlement of grievances when compared to civil suit); infra notes 142-62 and accompanying text.
39. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965) (employee must utilize
the grievance and arbitration procedures found in the collective bargaining agreement so
that work disputes can be settled in an orderly and peaceful manner). Preceding Maddox
were three Supreme Court decisions known as the "Steelworkers Trilogy": United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (if a collective bargaining
agreement provides grievance procedures, the agreement is to arbitrate all grievances and
not simply those which a court deems meritorious); United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (an order to arbitrate will not be
denied unless it can be positively shown that the arbitration clause does not cover the
dispute); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960) (courts will not overrule arbitrator's decision in which he is interpreting the employment contract). In these cases, the Court adopted the federal policy which favors the
arbitration of grievances because arbitration helps to promote industrial peace and stability. This policy led to the Supreme Court's decision in Maddox requiring the exhaustion
of contractual remedies. For a general discussion of the Steelworkers Trilogy, see Wollet,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 16

trine is to encourage the settling of disputes in the workplace
4
rather than in the courtroom and to promote industrial peace. 0
The Supreme Court, however, has created limited exceptions to
this exhaustion requirement, namely in cases involving federal statutory rights, such as those provided by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act 4' and by the Fair Labor Standards Act. 42 For example,
in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 4 3 an employer discharged a

union employee, who then filed a grievance against his employer
for unjust discharge. 4 After an arbitrator found the discharge to
be proper,45 the employee filed an action in federal court alleging
that the discharge was in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act.46 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the
arbitration proceeding did not bar the employee's action under Title VII.47 While the employee normally would have been bound by
The Agreement and the NationalLabor Relations Act: Courts, Arbitratorsand the NLRB
-- Who Divides What?, 14 LAB. L.J. 1041 (1963); Note, The Supreme Court Speaks on
Labor Arbitration-Exeunt the Courts, 13 STAN. L. REV. 635, 635-46 (1961).
40. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1961):
As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor policy
requries that individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must
attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and
union as the mode of redress. If the union refuses to press or only perfunctorily
presses the individual's claim, differences may arise as to the forms of redress
then available. Unless the contract provides otherwise, there can be no doubt
that the employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on his behalf.
Congress has expressly approved contract grievance procedures as a preferred
method for settling disputes and stabilizing the 'common law' of the plant.
A contrary rule which would permit an individual employee to completely
sidestep available grievance procedures in favor of a lawsuit has little to commend it. In addition to cutting across the interests already mentioned, it would
deprive employer and union of the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive
method for orderly settlement of employee grievances. If a grievance procedure
cannot be made exclusive, it loses much of its desirability as a method of settlement. A rule creating such a situation 'would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements.'
Id. at 652-53 (citations omitted). Further, even if an employee has exhausted all of his
remedies under the collective bargaining agreement, he must also prove that the union
breached its duty of fair representation before he can bring a civil action. Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171 (1967). A breach of the duty of fair representation can occur when the
union acts in an arbitrary, bad faith, or discriminatory manner towards the employee.
However, a union will not breach its duty of fair representation simply because it settled
an eimployee's grievance before arbitration. Id. at 190-93. See generally DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 1258-88.
41. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
42. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
43. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
44. d. at 39.
45. Id. at 42.
46. Id. at 43.
47. Id. at 59-60.

1985]

Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc.

the arbitration decision, the Alexander Court believed that the arbitration proceeding was an inappropriate forum in which to adjudicate federal statutory rights.48 According to the Court, the
employee's rights under Title VII were independent of his rights
under the collective bargaining agreement.4 9 Further, the arbitration process was informal and might not fully protect the rights
guaranteed by the federal statute."0 The Court also noted that arbitrators generally enforce the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement regardless of any
conflict which might arise between
5
those terms and Title VII. '
The NLRA and the federal labor policies advanced by the statute have done much to protect union employees from the harsh
effects of the employment at-will rule.5 2 This protection, however,
does not extend to the millions of employees who are not covered
by collective bargaining agreements.53 Consequently, some courts
have sought to protect4 such employees by recognizing the tort of
5
retaliatory discharge.

The tort

THE TORT OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
of retaliatory discharge1 5 provides a cause of

action to

48. Id. at 52-59.
49. Id. at 49-50.
50. Id.
51. Id. The Court earlier had stated:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective
bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial
justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award
is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 579, 593
(1960).
52. See Murg & Scharman, supra note 2, at 482.
53. Only 19.7% of American workers belong to a union. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS

412 (1980). In Illi-

nois, from 1970 to 1978, 1.54 million to 1.68 million workers in a total labor force of 5.1
million were members of a union. Id. at 108.
54. See Comment, Employment at- Will, supra note 2, at 991. Some courts that have
modified the employment at-will rule have been influenced by technological, economic,
and sociological changes in the nation. Id. The spread of judicial activism also helps
explain these decisions. See Note, Common Law Action, supra note 2, at 792. One commentator has argued that the courts ought to guarantee at-will employees the same rights
enjoyed by union employees. Peck, supra note 2, at 42. Peck argues that by not guaranteeing at-will employees the same rights, courts are denying the employee at-will equal
protection. The best explanation, however, for the modification of the employment atwill rule is that the results of the rule are harsh and unfair. See Blades, supra note 2, at
1405-10; see also supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
55. The first state to recognize a cause of action for retaliatory discharge was Califor-
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employees who are discharged for engaging in activities which are
favored as a matter of public policy, such as reporting for jury
duty,5 6 refusing to engage in an employer's illegal activities, 57 testifying before a grand jury58 or refusing to alter the results of pollution control tests.59 Courts which have recognized the tort have
nia in Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), where
the employer discharged his employee for refusing to commit perjury. The Petermann
court stated: "It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public
policy and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee, whether the
employment be for a designated or unspecified duration, on the ground that the employee
declined to commit perjury.
... Id. at 186, 344 P.2d at 27. See infra notes 56-68 and
accompanying text.
It should also be noted that courts have used other means besides the tort of retaliatory
discharge to modify the employment at-will rule. Some courts have used contract principles to find a just-cause provision in an employee's contract based on the employer's
express or implied promise that he would discharge the employee only for cause. See,
e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980)
(personnel manual, which stated that employees are fired only for just cause, gives rise to
enforceable contract rights).
Courts also have found an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment at-will contract. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass.
96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (even though employment relationship is terminable at-will,
there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the breach of which gives rise
to a breach of contract action); Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015
(Mont. 1984) (employer's objective manifestations to his employee that he is doing a good
job give rise to a duty of the employer to deal fairly and in good faith with his employee
and failure to do so is a breach of the employment contract); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,
114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (termination by the employer which is motivated by
bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interests of society and
constitutes a breach of the employment contract, even though it is a contract of employment at-will).
Courts also have utilized promissory estoppel to restrict the employment at-will rule.
See, e.g., Pursell v. Wolverine Pentronix, Inc., 91 Mich. App. 700, 702-04, 283 N.W.2d
833, 835 (1979) (employee who detrimentally relied on oral promise of employer for continued employment has a cause of action against employer when employer breaks promise); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (employee who
leaves one job in reliance upon the promise of another job is entitled to damages when the
second job offer is rescinded).
Employees who base discharge actions on contract principles usually can recover only
compensatory damages. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d
549 (1970) (employee who sues employer on breach of contract theory can recover only
compensatory damages and is not entitled to damages for mental suffering); Brockmeyer
v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (in contract action, damages are limited by concepts of foreseeability and mitigation); see also Murg & Scharman,
supra note 2, at 3, 5 - 7 2 ; Cor..n.e..t, r...p. .ymeni...ui- Wiuand
Law of Contracts, 23
BUFFALO L. REV. 211 (1973); Note, Job Security, supra note 18, at 340-45.
56. See Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512, 513 (1980).
57. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980) (employee discharged because he refused to participate in an illegal
scheme to fix the price of retail gasoline).
58. See Parnar v. American Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Hawaii 1982).
59. See Trombetta v. Detroit Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265
N.W.2d 385 (1978).
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attempted to spare employees at-will from choosing between keeping their jobs and promoting public policy. 60 By allowing punitive
damages, courts have deterred employers from making retaliatory
discharges. 6 ' Some courts have added to the tort's deterrent effect
by permitting discharged employees to recover damages for mental
pain and suffering.6 2
"Public policy" is an "inherently amorphous and ambiguous
concept. ' 63 Consequently, courts have had to determine on a case60. The Indiana Supreme Court held that an employee discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim must have a cause of action in tort for retaliatory discharge since
his discharge violates public policy. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249,
252, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1973). The court held that if public policy was to be implemented, "the employee must be able to exercise his right in an unfettered fashion without
being subject to reprisal." Id. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 427.
61. See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (because cause of
action sounds in tort, plaintiff who is discharged for refusing to violate consumer code is
entitled to punitive damages). One court has stated that the "thrust of punitive damages
may be the most effective means of deterring conduct" which may frustrate the purposes
of public policy. Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394, 396 (Nev. 1984) (discharge for filing
worker's compensation claim). See also Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 189-90,
384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (1978), where the court held that without punitive damages, there
would be little to dissuade an employer from discharging employees for reasons which
violate public policy. One commentator has stated:
The assessment of punitive damages in cases of abusive firings would be fitting
and desirable. They are typically awarded where the plaintiff's loss is caused by
the defendant's malicious, suppressive, wilful, wanton, or ruthless behavior and
the usual objective is deterrence. Deterrence should also be a prime objective of
the remedy for abusive discharge.
Blades, supra note 2, at 1427.
The tort action will provide greater protection than a retaliatory discharge action based
on contract principles because the employee normally is limited in contract actions to the
recovery of compensatory damages. See supra note 55. Commentators have also suggested that the tort action will provide an employee with greater protection than a collective bargaining agreement, Murg & Scharman, supra note 2, at 368-69, because the union
employee's remedy usually is limited to back pay and reinstatement. See Gorman, supra
note 6, at 138-39. In addition, the tort action gives the employee the right to a jury which
is likely to be more sympathetic than an arbitrator. Murg & Scharman, supra note 2, at
368-69.
62. See Tameny v. Ati. Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 616 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980).
63. Garry & Grove, Employment-At- Will in Illinois: Implications and Anticipations
for the Practitioner, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 359, 364 (1982). One court has described
public policy by stating:
The truth is that the theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of vague and
variable quality, and unless deducible in the given circumstances from constitutional or statutory provisions, should be accepted as the basis of judicial determination, if at all, only with the utmost circumspection. The public policy of
one generation may not under changed conditions, be the public policy of
another.
Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 (Md. App. 1981) (citing Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930)). Another court defined public policy as follows:
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by-case basis which activities are protected by the tort of retaliatory discharge. Public policy generally favors any activity believed
to safeguard the public good.' Thus, courts have allowed retaliatory discharge actions to be brought by employees discharged for
reporting the illegal activities of their employers,65 for refusing to
take lie detector tests66 and for filing workers' compensation
claims. 6 The Illinois Supreme Court first recognized the tort in an
action brought by an employee discharged for filing a workers'
compensation claim.68
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE IN ILLINOIS

In 1979, the Illinois Supreme Court approved of the tort of retaliatory discharge in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.6 9 In Kelsay, a Motorola employee had an employment contract which was terminable
at-will.7 ° After being injured while working in his employer's
plant, the employee filed a workers' compensation claim. 71 The
employer attempted to dissuade the employee from filing the claim;
however, the employee proceeded and was subsequently disThere is no precise definition of the term. In general it can be said the public
policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the state
collectively. It is to be found in the State's constitution and statutes and when
they are silent, in its judicial decisions.
Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester, 85 Ill. 2d 124, 126, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981) (citing
Smith v. Board of Educ., 405 Ill. 143, 147, 89 N.E.2d 893, 896 (1950)).
64. See Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (discharge for refusal to participate in anti-pricing scheme); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods,
Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (discharge for attempting to make sure that
employer's products comply with labeling and licensing laws).
65. See Adler v. American Standard Corp., 422 A.2d 464 (Md. App. 1981) (employee
discharged for reporting corporate malfeasance); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 85 Ill.
2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (employee discharged for supplying police with information about illegal activities of fellow employee); see generally Note, Protectingthe Private
Sector At- Will Employee Who "Blows the Whistle"? A Cause of Action Based on Detriment of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 777.
66. See Paerks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1366 (3d Cir. 1979).
67. See Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394, 397 (Nev. 1984); see also supra note.
68. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
69. Id. See generally Fillippi & Popko, Workmen's Compensation. New Cause of Action for RetaliatoryDischarge,68 ILL. B.J. 329 (1980); Note, Tort Remedy for Retaliatory
Dc.......
,l,
,i
'rt's
Compensation Act Limits Empioyer's Power to Discharge
Employees Terminable At-Will-Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 561
(1980); Note, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.-Illinois Courts Welcome Retaliatory Discharge
Suits Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 839.
70. Kelsay, 74 I11.
2d at 179, 384 N.E.2d at 356.
71. Id. When the defendant's personnel manager received notice of the claim, he told
the plaintiff that she would be "more than adequately compensated" for her injury if she
did not follow through with her claim. The plaintiff was told that company policy dictated the discharge of all employees who filed such claims. Id.
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charged.72 Thereafter, the employee filed a civil suit based on the
tort of retaliatory discharge and was awarded compensatory and
punitive damages. 73 The Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding
that the employee had no cause of action due to the employment
at-will rule.74
The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. 75
The court explained that the purpose of the workers' compensation
statute was to provide automatic recovery to employees for workrelated injuries. 76 According to the court, the public policy of the
state favored utilization of the remedies in the statute. 7 The court
then held that in order to enforce and implement this public policy,
72. id.
73. Id.
74. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 51 111. App. 3d 1016, 366 N.E.2d 1141 (1977).
75. Motorola made three arguments before the Supreme Court. First, it argued that
no cause of action should be recognized because the exclusivity provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act limited the employer's responsibility for compensation to certain enumerated occurrences. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 179, 384 N.E.2d at 356. Secondly,
Motorola stated that the Act contained no restrictions on an employer's right to discharge employees. Id. Finally, the defendant argued that by providing for criminal sanctions, the legislature had demonstrated its intention that the Act preclude civil remedies.
Id.
The Workers' Compensation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 138.11 (1983) provides:
"The compensation herein provided together with the provisions of this Act shall be the
measure of the responsibility of any employer engaged in any of the businesses or enterprises enumerated...." Paragraph 138.4(h) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any employer, insurance company or service or adjustment company to interfere with, restrain or coerce an employee in any manner whatsoever in the exercise of the rights or remedies granted to him or her by
this Act or to discriminate, attempt to discriminate, or threaten to discriminate
against an employee in any way because of his or her exercise of the rights or
remedies granted to him or her by this Act.
It shall be unlawful for any employer, individually or through any insurance
company or service or adjustment company, to discharge or to threaten to discharge, or to refuse to rehire or recall to active service in a suitable capacity an
employee because of the exercise of his or her rights or remedies granted to him
or her by this Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
138.4(h) (1983).
76. Id. at 180-81, 384 N.E.2d at 356. Under the common law, the defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow-servant rule made it difficult for
the employee to recover. See DARLING-HAMMONG & KNEISER, THE LAW AND EcoNOMICS OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION 7-8 (1980).
77. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357. Workers' compensation laws serve
several public-policy objectives besides prompt recovery for work-related injuries, such as
relieving the financial drain incurred by charities as a result of uncompensated injuries at
the workplace, promoting employer interest in job safety and rehabilitation, preventing
accidents by encouraging objective studies of the causes of accidents, and discouraging
concealment of work hazards. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U.S.A., ANALYSIS OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, HISTORY OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY,

(1974 ed.),

[Vol. 16

Loyola University Law Journal

a cause of action for retaliatory discharge should exist.78 If the tort
were not allowed, employees would be forced to choose between
their jobs and their statutory rights under the workers' compensation statute. 79 An employer's right to discharge was no longer as
absolute as it once was. The right to discharge could not be used
to defeat the purpose of the workers' compensation statute.
The court also held that the inclusion of criminal sanctions in
the statute did not preclude the bringing of a civil action. 8° The
criminal sanctions, according to the court, were not a sufficient deterrent for the discharging employer. 8' The court therefore held
that in the future, employees would be able to recover punitive
damages as this was the most effective way to deter the unethical
employer from discharging employees who file workers' compensation claims.82
In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.,83 the Illinois
Supreme Court extended the tort of retaliatory discharge to cover
any discharge which contravened the public policy of the state.84
In this case, the employee had been discharged for reporting the
illegal activities of his coworker to the police. 85 Recently, in
78. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
79. Id. The court stated: "We cannot ignore the fact that when faced with such a
dilemma, many employees would choose to retain their jobs, and thus, in effect, would be
left without a remedy either common or statutory." Id.
80. Id. See supra note 75 for the relevant text of the statute.
81. Kelsay, 74 111. 2d at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357. The court rejected the holding of the
Seventh Circuit in Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1979). The
Seventh Circuit had held that the legislature would not have omitted a civil cause of
action for retaliatory discharge from such comprehensive and integrated legislation unless it had intended to preclude such a civil action. Id. at 748. The Kelsay court stated
that even though there was no explicit proscription against retaliatory discharge, the
court did not think that the legislature intended that an employee choose between workers' compensation and continued employment. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 182, 384 N.E.2d at
357.
82. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 178, 185, 384 N.E.2d at 358-59, 360. The court stated: "In
the absence of other effective means of deterrence, punitive damages must be permitted to
prevent the discharging of employees for filing workmen's compensation claims." Id. at
176, 384 N.E.2d at 359.
83. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
84. See supra note 63 for the Palmateer court's definition of public policy. For a
dis-cu
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Retaliatory Dishcarge in Illinois, 71 ILL B.J. 298 (1983); Peck, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment At- Will Rule. Illinois Creates an Amorphous Tort, 59 Chi. Kent
L. Rev. 247 (1982).
85. Palmateer,85 Ill. 2d at 127, 421 N.E.2d at 877. The court found that underlying
the Illinois Criminal Code was a public policy which favored the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses and that the discharge violated this policy and thus gave rise
to a cause of action in tort for retaliatory discharge. Id. at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
The Illinois Appellate Court has extended the tort of retaliatory discharge to cover
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Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc. ,86 the Illinois Supreme Court extended the tort of retaliatory discharge to union employees covered
by a collective bargaining agreement which contains grievance
procedures.8 7
Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc.
Facts
Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc. was a consolidated appeal in
which the plaintiffs, union employees, had filed a suit in tort for
other violations of public policy. See Witt v. Forest Hospital, Inc., 125 I11.App. 3d 481,
450 N.E.2d 811 (1st Dist. 1983) (Section 34 of the Guardianship And Advocacy Act, Ill
Rev. Stat. ch. 911/2, 734 (1983), which protects any person who produces information
under the Act, supports a cause of action for retaliatory discharge when an employee is
discharged for producing information); Petrick v. Monarch Printing Corp., 111 111. App.
3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1st Dist. 1982) (employee who was discharged for refusing to
support criminal activities of employer has a cause of action in tort for retaliatory discharge).
In other cases, the appellate court has refused to extend the definition of retaliatory
discharge. See Mein v. Masonite Corp., 124 Ill. App. 3d 617, 464 N.E.2d 1137 (1st Dist.
1984) ( employee who alleges wrongful discharge based on age has no cause of action for
retaliatory discharge and is limited to remedies under the Illinois Human Rights Act, Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 68,
1-101 to 9-102 (1983)); Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 124 Ill. App.
3d 979, 464 N.E.2d 1245 (4th Dist. 1984) (employee who alleges dismissal for submitting
a claim under group health insurance plan has no cause of action for retaliatory discharge); Witkowski v. St. Anne's Hosp. of Chicago, Inc., 113 Ill. App. 3d 745, 447
N.E.2d 1016 (1st Dist. 1983) (employee who claims discharge was in retaliation for exercise of rights under disability benefit plan has no cause of action for retaliatory discharge
as cause of action is preempted by ERISA.)
86. 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984).
87. Id. In Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 402, 407 N.E.2d 95 (3d
Dist. 1980), the Illinois Appellate Court had addressed this issue and had held that a
union employee had no cause of action because the employee was covered by a just-cause
provision in his union contract. Id. at 406, 407 N.E.2d at 99. ("To permit an employee
to circumvent procedures mutually agreed upon for handling grievances by filing suit in
the first instance would undermine the collective bargaining agreement."). Id. See also
Suddreth v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 114 I11.App. 3d 296, 449 N.E.2d 203 (2d Dist. 1983)
(worker who alleges discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim has no cause of
action in tort for retaliatory discharge and must use grievance and arbitration procedures
in the collective bargaining agreement); Deatrick v. Funk Seeds Int'l, 109 Ill. App. 3d
296, 441 N.E.2d 669 (4th Dist. 1982) (summary judgment granted to employer who alleged as affirmative defense that plaintiff had not exhausted his remedies under the collective bargaining agreement).
In Wyatt v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 108 I11.App. 3d 840, 439 N.E.2d 1053 (1st Dist. 1982), A
different panel of the appellate court disagreed with Cook and held that a union employee
does have a cause of action in tort whether he has utilized his contract remedies or not.
The court stated: "In Kelsay an employee discharged for filing a workmen's compensation claim has an action in tort . . . [w]hile the employee in Kelsay happened to be an
employee at-will, the court did not limit its holding to such employees." Id. at 841, 439
N.E.2d at 1054. See also Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 118 Ill. App. 3d 7, 454 N.E.2d
1092 (1st Dist. 1983) affid, 105 Ill. 2d 143, 454 N.E.2d 1280 (1984).
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retaliatory discharge, alleging that they were discharged for filing
workers' compensation claims.88 The plaintiffs were covered by
collective bargaining agreements, each of which contained a justcause discharge provision 89 as well as grievance and binding arbitration procedures. 90 None of the plaintiffs, however, attempted to
challenge his discharge within the grievance procedures before filing his action for retaliatory discharge. 9
The trial courts dismissed the complaints for failure to state a
cause of action. 92 In one of the cases, the First District of the Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that under Kelsay, the employee's complaint in tort for retaliatory discharge stated a
cognizable claim. 93 The Fourth District of the Appellate Court,
however, did not allow the tort of retaliatory discharge, following
precedent which had held that a union employee must exhaust all
of his contractual remedies before attempting to bring his employer
to

court.

94

The Majority Opinion
The majority of the Illinois Supreme Court held that the union
employees could pursue an action for retaliatory discharge even
though they were covered by a collective bargaining agreement.95
Following the reasoning of Kelsay, the court stated that the tort
action could be maintained by any employee discharged in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy. 96 In these cases, by
discharging the union employees for filing workers' compensation
claims, the employers violated the public policy considerations underlying the workers' compensation statute. 97 The court reasoned
88. Midgett, 105 Ill.
2d at 146, 473 N.E.2d at 1282. The cases consolidated were
Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 118 II1. App. 3d 7, 454 N.E.2d 1092 (1st Dist. 1983)
and Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp., 118 Ill.
App. 3d 1167, 470 N.E.2d 663 (4th
Dist. 1983) (mem.).
89. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
90. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 147-48, 473 N.E.2d at 1282.
91. Id. at 146-48, 473 N.E.2d at 1282.
92. Id. at 146, 473 N.E.2d at 1281.
93. Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 118 Ill. App. 3d 7, 10, 454 N.E.2d 1092, 1095
I-

*
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94. Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Co., 118 Ill. App. 3d 1167, 470 N.E.2d 663
(4th Dist. 1983) (mem.). Although the case was disposed of by order, it is clear that the
court was following precedent. See Deatrick v. Funk Seeds International, 109 Iil. App.
3d 998, 441 N.E.2d 669 (4th Dist. 1982) (union employee must exhaust contractual remedies before attempting to bring his employer to court).
95. Midgett, 105 I11.
2d at 152, 473 N.E.2d at 1283-84.
96. Id. at 151-52, 473 N.E.2d at 1283-84.
97. Id. at 151, 473 N.E.2d at 1284. A discharge in retaliation for the filing of a
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that if union employees were not given a cause of action in tort for
retaliatory discharge, public policy would be undermined since
such employees might be reluctant to file workers' compensation
claims. 9 Moreover, allowing union employees to bring an action
for retaliatory discharge also would effectively deter employers
from dismissing employees who filed such claims. 99
Under most collective bargaining agreements, an employer must
offer reinstatement and give back pay to an employee who has been
discharged improperly.I°° The Midgett court held that these contractual remedies did not sufficiently deter employers from discharging employees in violation of public policy while the tort
action, which allows the imposition of punitive damages, would be
an effective deterrent.' 0 ' Further, the court believed that it would
be unfair to exempt an employer who discharges a union employee
from punitive damages while at the same time assessing punitive
damages in actions filed by an at-will employee. 02 Alternatively,
the court found no reason to allow an at-will employee to recover
these punitive damages while not giving this same opportunity to
union employees. 103
In response to the employer's argument that federal labor law
policy, which requires the exhaustion of contractual remedies,
would be violated if union employees were granted a cause of action in tort, the court held that the strong state interest in protectworkers' compensation claim led to the first retaliatory discharge action allowed in Illinois. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text. In Midgett, the court stated:
That Illinois has a strong public policy to insure the protection of workers covered by the Workers' Compensation Act is clear. Section 6 of the Act (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 138.6) requires employers to post printed notices containing information concerning the Act which is necessary to aid employees to
safeguard their rights under the Act in the event of injury. Employers are required to file reports of injuries and other matters with the Commission, and the
failure to do so constitutes a petty offense. Section 26 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch.
48 par. 138.26) provides that in the event of any violation of the Act, which is
declared to be a petty offense, the Attorney General and the State's Attorney of
each county, upon the request of the Industrial Commission, shall enforce the
penalties prescribed in the Act.
Midgett, 105 I11.2d at 151, 473 N.E.2d at 1284.
98. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 149-50, 473 N.E.2d at 1283-84.
99. Id.
100. Silzer, Workmen's Compensation: Retaliatory Discharge of Employees Covered
by a Collective BargainingAgreement, 70 ILL. B.J. 164, 166 (1981).
101. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 150, 473 N.E.2d at 1283-84. Punitive damages may be
awarded in arbitration proceedings but only in cases in which the arbitrator finds that the
employer's contractual violations were knowing and repeated or that a single violation
was wilful and flagrant. Elkouri and Elkouri, supra note 32, at 1357.
102. Midgett, 105 I11. 2d at 150, 473 N.E.2d at 1284.
103. Id.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 16

ing employees' rights was too important to disallow the action.' °4
The court noted several United States Supreme Court decisions
which have allowed union employees covered by collective bargaining agreements to proceed directly to court with claims
founded upon violations of federal statutory rights.10 5 The majority also stated that the tort action was independent of any rights or
obligations under the collective bargaining agreement 0 6 and would
have no perceptible impact on the use of arbitration procedures. 107
The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent argued that the majority had turned what was once
a limited exception for at-will employees into a general rule applicable to all employees.' 0 The dissent believed that a collective bar104. Id. at 151, 473 N.E.2d at 1284.
105. Id. (citing McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 US. 284 (1984) (civil rights);
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (198 1) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (racial discrimination)).
The court also relied on several state decisions which have allowed union employees
remedies independent of those available under collective bargaining agreements. See
Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 152, 473 N.E.2d at 1284-85 (citing Peabody Gallion v. Dollar, 666
F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981) (Oklahoma statute creates rights independent of collective
bargaining agreement); Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 22
Cal. 3d 658, 586 P.2d 564, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1978) (violation of statute creates independent right of employee to wrongful discharge action against his employer); Puchert
v. Agsalud, 677 P.2d 649 (Hawaii 1984) (statutory right to wrongful discharge action is
independent of remedies under collective bargaining agreement); Vaughn v. Pacific
Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281 (1980) (employee who was
discharged for trying to recover money for work-related injuries need not exhaust remedies in collective bargaining agreement before filing suit); Carnation Co. v. Burner, 610
S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980) (employee who files suit under workers' compensation law and is
subsequently dismissed need not exhaust his contractual remedies before suing employer
for wrongful discharge)). See also infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
106. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 148, 473 N.E.2d at 1283.
107. Id. at 151, 473 N.E.2d at 1284.
108. Id. at 155, 473 N.E.2d at 1386 (Moran, J., dissenting). The Illinois Appellate
Court had stated that the policy considerations which were present in Kelsay were not
present in the case of a union employee. Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d
402, 406, 407 N.E.2d 95, 98 (3d Dist. 1980). Since the discharge provisions of the collective bargaining agreement protect the employee from retaliatory discharge, the union
employee does not suffer the dilemma of choosing between his job and his workers' com-...........
,.
.
l.O Lamb v. oiggs vlg., 70 F.2d i092 (7th Cir. i983)
(plaintiff who is covered by collective bargaining agreement has no cause of action in tort
for retaliatory discharge even though arbitrator held his discharge to be unjust); Vantine
v. Elkhart Brass Mfg., 572 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (absent evidence showing that
union breached its duty of fair representation during arbitration process, employee has no
cause of action for retaliatory discharge); Brainard v. Imperial Mfg. Co., 571 F. Supp. 37
(D.R.I. 1983) (employee who fails to exhaust contractual remedies has no cause of action
for retaliatory discharge); Payne v. Pennzoil Corp., 138 Ariz. 52, 679 P.2d 1322 (1983)
(union employee discharged for filing workers' compensation claim has no cause of action
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gaining agreement which permits an employee to be fired only for
just cause provides adequate protection from retaliatory
discharge.

109

The dissent also argued that by allowing union employees to
bring an action in tort for retaliatory discharge, the majority undermined the objectives of collective bargaining, namely, that the
employee voluntarily bargained with the employer for an agreement containing grievance and arbitration procedures and the employee ought to be bound by that agreement. 1° Moreover, the
dissent noted that the United States Supreme Court had established a policy favoring the exhaustion of contractual remedies in
order to promote industrial peace, a policy which would be subverted by allowing union employees to proceed directly to court."'
ANALYSIS

By extending the tort of retaliatory discharge to union employees, the Midgett court arguably invited industrial strife by allowing
union employees to circumvent contractual grievance and arbitration procedures."I 2 After Midgett, some factual disputes over employers' motives for discharging union employees, disputes
formally resolved in the workplace itself or before impartial arbitrators, will be heard by juries more likely to be sympathetic to the
employee's plight." 3 Yet the extension of the tort to union employees was both logical and necessary in order to give full effect to
14
the state's strong public policy against retaliatory discharges.
While public policy also favors arbitration of labor disputes," 15
contractual remedies simply are not effective deterrents against retaliatory discharges." 6 More importantly, neither the workplace
nor the arbitrator's office is an appropriate forum in which to enforce the public policy of the state,' 'I especially when that policy
sets up a right independent of the collective bargaining
for retaliatory discharge); Embry v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 62 Or. App. 183,
655 P.2d 436 (1983) (employee must exhaust the grievance procedures within his collective bargaining agreement before he attempts to file an action for retaliatory discharge).
109. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 155-56, 173 N.E.2d at 1286-87 (Moran, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 69-85, 96-98, 104 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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agreement.I 18
The Midgett court followed the reasoning of Kelsay v. Motorola,
Inc.,19 the first Illinois case to allow a tort action for retaliatory
discharge. 2 ° In Kelsay, the Illinois Supreme Court approved the
tort in part because the employee at-will was perceived as a victim
subject to discharge for engaging in activities which were favored
as a matter of public policy.' 2 ' In contrast, the union employee,
with his collective bargaining agreement in hand, generally is able
to protect himself because the agreement states that an employee
can be fired only upon a showing of just cause.' 22 Moreover, if the
employee is discharged without proper cause, he may contest the
discharge through contractual grievance procedures that culminate
in arbitration binding on all parties.'23 It is doubtful that a discharge which violated public policy, such as one for filing a workers' compensation claim, would be held to be with proper cause. 24
Consequently, the union employee at first glance does not appear
to need the tort of retaliatory discharge since the collective bargaining agreement protects him when he engages in activities favored by public policy.
In granting the union employee a cause of action in tort for retaliatory discharge, the Midgett decision also seems to conflict with
federal labor law policy, which favors the use of arbitration to settle labor disputes.' 25 Arbitration gives the union and the employer
118. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
119. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
120. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
121. Kelsay, 74 I11.2d at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
122. See Blades, supra note 2, at 1404-05; see also Summers, supra note 2, at 482-84.
123. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
124. The Illinois Appellate Court has stated that a collective bargaining agreement
need not enumerate retaliatory discharge as a grievance for it to be arbitrated under a
just-cause provision. Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 402, 405-06, 407
N.E.2d 95, 98 (3d Dist. 1980). Arbitrators are free to determine whether any kind of
termination meets the just-cause requirements of the agreement. Id. The Supreme Court
has stated: "Gaps may be left to be filled in by reference to the practices of the particular
industry and of the various shops covered by the agreement. Many of the specific practices which underlie the agreement may be unknown, except in hazy form ..
" Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580. The collective bargaining
a gr ,m.t
is .... ed--------ver a.1 of the employment reiationship. id. at 579.
125. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. The court refused to consider
another aspect of federal labor law, namely, preemption of state causes of action by the
NLRA or by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 301
(1982). Midgett, 105 I11.2d at 153, 473 N.E.2d at 1386. The preemption issues resulting
from extension of the retaliatory discharge action to union employees are beyond the
scope of this note. For the Supreme Court's latest pronouncements on the subject of
Federal labor-law preemption, see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct.
2380 (1985); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985).
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the opportunity to develop a uniform and exclusive method for set26
tling disputes in the workplace and for avoiding industrial strife. 1
The use of grievance and arbitration procedures allows the parties
to resolve the dispute in a manner which is inexpensive and expeditious for the employer and the employee, thereby saving the expense and time involved in a civil action. 27 Since the employee
now can circumvent the collective bargaining agreement and take
his employer directly to court, retaliatory discharge actions may
disrupt the orderly administration of disputes which arbitration
28
promotes and thereby undermine federal labor law policy.
In addition, the Midgett decision will make it more difficult for
the employer to prevail in disputes over the actual reason for the
discharge of an employee. Before Midgett, an arbitrator familiar
with such disputes determined if the discharge was just. 29 Under
Midgett, such determinations often will be made by jurors less
knowledgeable than arbitrators and perhaps more sympathetic towards the employee. 3 ° The increased possibility of civil liability,
including punitive damages,' may make employers leery of discharging employees even when the discharge would be just. 32 Yet,
the strong public policy considerations underlying the workers'
compensation statute'3 3 fully justified extension of the tort of retaliatory discharge to union employees. Moreover, the extension was
necessary in order to provide the union employee with the opportunity to obtain punitive damages as part of his "complete remedy"
for the retaliatory discharge. ' 34 Further, the tort was extended so
that no employer who discharged an employee in violation of public policy would be immune from punishment merely because that
35
employee was covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
The tort of retaliatory discharge exists not only to protect the
126. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
127. See Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 415 U.S. 36, 55 (1974); see also Barrentine
v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) "By
bringing together persons actually involved in the workplace, often assisted by a neutral
arbitrator experienced in such matters, disputes are resolved more swiftly and cheaply.
This mechanism promotes industrial harmony and avoids strikes and conflicts; it provides a swift, fair, and inexpensive remedy.").
128. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
129. See Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 36, at 53-56.
130. Blades, supra note 2, at 1428. See also Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.,
85 Ill. 2d 124, 142-45, 421 N.E.2d 876, 884-86 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
131. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
132. Blades, supra note 2, at 1428.
133. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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employee, but also to punish the employer and to deter the employer from making retaliatory discharges in the future.' 36 For
these reasons, the Illinois Supreme Court gave employees the opportunity to collect punitive damages.' 31 In arbitration proceedings, however, punitive damages normally are not awarded;
instead, the employee may be reinstated with back pay. 38 Hence,
without some remedy independent of the collective bargaining
agreement, the union employee would be denied the opportunity to
recover punitive damages, an opportunity which is given to all
other employees, 39 and the employer might be less fearful of discharging his employees in violation of public policy.
Besides providing an incomplete remedy, the grievance and arbitration process is an inappropriate forum in which to enforce the
public policy which underlies the tort of retaliatory discharge. Arbitrators are no more qualified to implement the public policy of
Illinois than they were to enforce the federal statutory right at issue in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.140 Arbitrators are bound
by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.1 4 ' Thus, if
public policy is in conflict with the agreement, the arbitrator is
bound to uphold the agreement and the public policy of the state
may go unenforced. Further, even when no conflict exists, the informal arbitration process may not afford full protection of rights
derived from the state's public policy. 142 A judicial proceeding is
136. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
137. Id.
138. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
139. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 150, 473 N.E.2d at 1284. The court went on to state: "If
there is no possibility that an employer can be liable in punitive damages, not only has the
employee been afforded an incomplete remedy, but there is no available sanction against a
violation of an important public policy of this State." Id.
140. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text. Several commentators have suggested that the reasoning of Alexander is applicable to the tort of
retaliatory discharge and its interference with federal labor-law policy. See Comment,
State Action for Wrongful Discharge: Overcoming Barriers Posed by Federal Labor Law
Preemption, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 942, 967-68 (1983); Comment, NLRA Preemption of State
Wrongful Discharge Claims, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 657-59 (1983); Note, Common Law
Action, supra note 2, at 1462-63. See also Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d
1367 (10th Cir. 1984) (state interests can override federal labor law policy requiring exhausiion of contractual remedies); Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 289
Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281 (1980) (state may interfere with collective bargaining agreement
when interference occurs to protect a substantial state interest); but see Payne v. Pennzoil
Corp., 138 Ariz. 52, 672 P.2d 1322 (1983) (exception to exhaustion requirement only
when federal statute provides remedy); Embry v. Pacific Stationery, 62 Or. App. 183, 659
P.2d 436 (1983)(union employee barred from suit unless there is an independent statute
to support it).
141. See supra note 51.
142. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59.
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often necessary to guarantee that the public policy is fully
effectuated.
Moreover, some employee grievances may not even reach the
arbitration stage.' 43 If the union refuses in good faith to process a
grievance, the union employee will be left without a remedy against
his employer."4 In Alexander, the Court's concern for the "remediless employee" provided an additional ground for giving union
employees access to the courts. 45 In Midgett, if the Illionis
Supreme Court had not granted the union employee a separate
cause of action and if the union in good faith had refused to proceed with his grievance, the employee would have been left without
a remedy and more importantly, public policy would have gone
unenforced.
Finally, the tort of retaliatory dischargc should be viewed as a
right independent of the collective bargainihg agreement, similar to
the Title VII claim which the Alexander Court found to be independent of the union employee's contractual rights. 46 The tort
of retaliatory discharge originates in the public policy of the state
that seeks to protect employees who suffer work-related injuries. 141
143. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59 n. 19. According to one commentator, the very
nature of arbitration can impede the individual's efforts to have his rights protected.
Moses, Deferral to Arbitrationin Individual Rights Cases: A Reexamination of Spielberg,
51 TENN. L. REV. 187, 229 (1984). In arbitration proceedings, the employer and the
union are the only parties to the proceedings since they are the parties to the contract.
Id. at 229. The individual is represented by the union and therefore at the mercy of the
union. Id. The cost of arbitration is high and consequently, the union may refuse to
arbitrate the claim. Id. Further, if the employee is an unpopular union member, his
grievance may be affected by reasons totally unrelated to the merits of his grievance. Id.
Although he may complain to the National Labor Relations Board that his union has
breached its duty of fair representation, such cases are difficult to prove. Id.
144. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (unless employee can show breach of
good faith, he is not entitled to cause of action in federal court based on collective bargaining agreement); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) (failure to show bad faith
at arbitration hearing precludes union employees from bringing civil suit to determine
seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement). See also supra note 39; Moses,
supra note 143, at 227.
145. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 n. 21.
146. Id. at 52 ("[A] contractual right to submit a claim to arbitration is not displaced
simply because Congress also has provided a statutory right against discrimination. Both
rights have legally independent origins and are equally available to the aggrieved
employee.")
147. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 144, 473 N.E.2d at 1283. As one judge has stated:
Exhaustion of the remedies provided in a collective bargaining agreement is a
logical and sensible prerequisite to the maintenance of a cause of action when
that cause is based upon a violation of the terms of the agreement itself. ...
The plaintifrs cause of action [however] sounds not in contract, but in tort. It is
based not upon violation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement,
but upon a violation of the public policy of the State of Illinois.
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The tort was created in order to provide employees with a complete remedy and to deter employers from violating public policy.11s A retaliatory discharge action does not replace or limit the
just-cause provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. It
merely grants the employee an additional remedy if his discharge
violates public policy.' 49
IMPACT

Allowing a union employee a cause of action in tort for retaliatory discharge may interfere with dispute-resolution procedures established in collective bargaining agreements. Nevertheless,
Illinois has interests to protect15 ° and allowance of the cause of
action will not interfere greatly with the grievance-arbitration process. As it stands now, union employees only will have a cause of
action for retaliatory discharge when the discharge contravenes
public policy. Thus far, the Illinois Supreme Court has limited the
tort action to discharges for the filing of workers' compensation
claims and for the reporting of illegal activities. 1 ' All other disputes arising under the collective bargaining agreement still are
subject to grievance and arbitration procedures.
It is also possible that allowance of the tort action for retaliatory
discharge will undermine the status of the union. One of the major
benefits of union representation is the protection from unjust dis15 2
charges afforded by grievance and arbitration procedures.
Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 402, 407 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Barry, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
149. Midgett, 105 I11. 2d at 151, 473 N.E.2d at 1284, citing Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 118 I11.App. 3d 7, 9, 454 N.E.2d 1092, 1094 (1st Dist. 1983). Actions which
allege a discharge for the filing of a workers' compensation claim find their source in the
law of the state and not in the collective bargaining agreement. Comment, NLRA Preemption of State Wrongful DischargeClaims, supra note 140, at 660.
A claim grounded in state law for wrongful termination for public policy reasons poses no significant threat to the collective bargaining process; it does not
alter the economic relationship between the employer and employee. The remedy is in tort distinct from any contractual remedy an employee might have
under the collective bargaining contract. It furthers the state interest in proting
t Ht general public - an interest which transcends the employment
relationship.
Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367, 1375 (10th Cir. 1984).
150. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
152. The grievance procedure is a swift and inexpensive method for an employee to
resolve his grievance. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. Additionally, the
cause of action will not undermine the employer's incentive to arbitrate grievances and
therefore " 'sound the death knell for arbitration clauses in labor contracts'" since the
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Under the Midgett decision, the employee may abandon the union
and the grievance procedures gained for him and obtain his own
remedy, including punitive damages, in a civil court. 5 3 The union
contract, however, still offers significant benefits to employees discharged on grounds unrelated to the state's public policy. 5 4 Moreover, the union offers the employee the opportunity to obtain better
wages and working conditions through collective bargaining.155
Thus, it is unlikely that extension of the tort of retaliatory discharge to union employees will do much damage to the status of
the union.
One issue sure to arise after Midgett will be what weight courts
should give arbitrators' decisions in cases where the employee has
exhausted contractual remedies before filing a civil action for retaliatory discharge. The United States Supreme Court in Alexander
has suggested that lower courts must look to the particular facts
and circumstances of each case.' 56 In determining the weight to be
given the arbitrator's decision, a court should consider factual similarities between the tort action claim and the grievance, the fairness and adequacy of the arbitration process, and the competency
of the arbitrator. 57 In the final determination, however, the court
must be certain that public policy is being enforced, regardless of
the consideration the arbitrator may hae given to the employee's
claim.
CONCLUSION

The employment at-will rule has undergone substantial change
in recent years. Courts and legislatures have altered the rule in
order to soften the rule's effects on the employee. Congress passed
the National Labor Relations Act, which fostered the growth of
collective bargaining and the arbitration of employee grievances,
main reason an employer agrees to arbitration is to get the union's reciprocal promise not
to strike. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 54-55 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346
F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (D. Colo. 1971).
153. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
154. See Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 32, at 630.
155. GORMAN, supra note 6, at 496-525.
156. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 n. 21.
157. Id. One commentator in discussing the weight the federal court should give an
arbitration decision which has its basis in Title VII, argued that no weight should be
given the prior decision since this would be the most effective method to fully protect
Title VII rights. See Richards, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.: A Threat to Title VII
Rights, 29 ARK. L. REV. 129, 184 (1975). The Illinois Supreme Court could also take
this approach and refuse to grant the arbitration decision any weight.
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including unjust discharges. Courts also have lessened the rule's
impact through creation of the tort of retaliatory discharge.
The Illinois Supreme Court recognized this tort action to spare
at-will employees the choice between keeping their jobs and upholding public policy. In Midgett, the tort was extended to union
employees, thus raising questions about the federal labor law policy which requires the exhaustion of contractual remedies.
The state interest in enforcing public policy, however, outweighs
the interests of federal labor law policy. Grievance and arbitration
proceedings are simply inappropriate forums in which to protect
and promote the public policy of the state. Moreover, the expansion of the tort will do little, if any, damage to the effectiveness of
grievance and arbitration procedures. The tort action for retaliatory discharge must be viewed as a right independent of rights arising from the collective bargaining agreement. The expansion of
the tort of retaliatory discharge was necessary in order to effectuate
fully the public policies of Illinois.
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